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CIVIL RIGHTS IMPACT
ON THE CHURCH
STUART D. HUBBELL, ESQUIRE
HUBBELL, BLAKESLEE, MCCORMICK & HOULIHAN
TRAVERSE CITY, MICHIGAN
Catholic Civil Rights in Jeopardy
I take it that I would not be seen as an extremist or one who is misin-
formed if I were to begin this little talk on a very large subject with the
assertion that Catholics and Catholic institutions, today perhaps more
than ever before in the history of this country, are under very concerted
pressures, and even to some degree attacked, by private agencies and
individuals, government agencies, and the courts. The reasons for this
increase in activity against things Catholic-if it does exist as I be-
lieve-can be speculatively traced to a number of sources: the Church's
position on birth control, abortion, school aid, and, I suppose, the plain
fact that we are in a society which is more and more aggressively and
militantly secular in outlook. The ideal of tolerance of religious viewpoints
of others does not today hold the high place in the scale of civic values it
once seemed to, even if that value scale may have been more evidenced
by expression than by deeply held belief.
Under attack, too, it seems to me beyond question, are social values
and institutions that Catholics and others as well hold as fundamental to
a stable and civilized society. Particularly under attack, of course, is the
family and parental rights in the area of sex education with specific
challenges of parents' rights to control abortion and distribution of birth
control devices and information to minors without their knowledge or con-
sent.
I don't believe I need to elaborate too extensively on the existence of
these issues, but let me cite some current examples:
(a) Doe v. Ingham Board of Health (W.D. Mich.). Birth control devices to
minors by county and state without knowledge or consent of parent;
(b) ZPG (Zero Population Growth) teacher-physician prior right to teach
challenging Michigan right of parent to withdraw from sex education and'
prohibiting the teaching of birth control in the public schools; Alexander R.
Mercer, et al, v. Michigan State Board of Education, et al.;
(c) Dr. Bolles' case: Colorado statute making it a crime for a person to
communicate to another person "with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm an-
other person . . . in a manner likely to harass or cause alarm." Trial court
held unconstitutional violation of rights of free speech; appellate court re-
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versed on grounds that there were present some factual issues; Colorado
Supreme Court granted certiorari, State of Colorado v. Bolles;
(d) State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975) (en banc).
Minor's right of privacy exceeds parental right to be advised or consent to
abortion. See to same effect Foe v. Vanderhoof, No. 74-418 D. Colo. (2/5/75).
(e) Washington St. Patrick's Episcopal case . . . court required that before
expansion of a nonpublic school be allowed the impact upon attendance at
the public school be determined by the Zoning Appeal Board. The Zoning
Appeal Board has apparently rejected this as an inappropriate standard for
its consideration notwithstanding the reviewing court's position. Case may
be under appeal;
(f) The right of a wife to have an abortion notwithstanding her husband's
objection upheld in Massachusetts, Doe v. Doe, No. 74-35 Eq. Mass. Sup.
Ct. . . . husband estranged, argued that to compel her to have the baby was
a violation of 13th antislavery amendment;
(g) Federal injunction requiring expenditure of county funds to pay physi-
cians for performance of abortions out of public general relief monies. Doe v.
Ceci, No. 74-C-406, decided 10-21-74. (Couldn't get a doctor to perform. He
ordered hospital to perform abortions or find an abortionist or to close down
the OB unit);
(h) State tuition grants to college students was held violative of the first
amendment by a three-judge federal constitutional court in Tennessee.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Dunn, 43 U.S.L.W.
2227 (D.C. Tenn., Nov. 8, 1974), vacated sub nom. Blanton v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, 95 S. Ct. 1943 (1975). Combined
with Maryland case which provided direct aid to college, private. Roemer v.
Board of Public Works of State of Maryland, et al. . . . lower court upheld;
(i) Husband's consent not necessary for wife's sterilization and no suit will
lie against physician who proceeds without consent. Murray v. Vandevander,
522 P. 2d 302, (Okla. App. 1974);
(j) Within the last two weeks the Michigan Supreme Court denied partici-
pation of nonpublic school children in a state wide program of public school
textbooks for all school children in all schools adopted by our state legislature
last summer. This, in spite of the Allen textbook case. Advisory Opinion re
Constitutionality of 1974 PA 242, No. 56354 (4-29-75).
(k) Too many cases to cite have held that the state must fund abortion
payments out of Medicaid. Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D 1974).
Doe v. Mundy, - F. Supp. - No. 74-C-224 E.D. Wis. (7-2-74); Doe v.
Wohlgemuth, 376 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Pa. 1974). Latter case stated: "We do
not hold that the state must finance a fundamental right, but we do hold that
the expression of that fundamental right cannot be the basis for invidious
discrimination."
(Query: how does this doctrine of the right to payment out of public funds
for abortion because it is a fundamental right square with the refusal to pay
for secular education of children attending nonpublic schools out of religious
conviction as a matter of fundamental right? In other words, it is a state
obligation to pay for the killing of unborn babies but not for their secular
education after they are born.)
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We are all aware, I assume, of the so-called litigation kit which has
been prepared and disseminated by proabortion, prosterilization forces
seeking to provide an impetus for widespread litigation which has pro-
duced sporadic litigation in various localities across the country.
Finally, the entire history of the school aid question's treatment by the
courts, and in particular the birth of the repressive concept (which appar-
ently is applicable to Catholics alone in this country) that legislation
violates the first amendment if it leads to political division along religious
lines. "
There are two other areas of concern which I would call to your atten-
tion before suggesting some potential vehicles for remedial action. Both the
IRS and the Department of Health Education and Welfare are propos-
ing-and appear about ready to adopt-regulations which could have far-
reaching and possibly adverse impact upon Catholic institutions.
Proposed IRS Affirmative Action Policies
As a condition for continued exemption under IRC §§ 501(a) and
501(c)(3), the proposed IRS regulations would require all private schools
to adopt an affirmative action program of nonracial discrimination.
That the IRS has the authority to impose such a policy and to deny
tax-exempt and tax deductible status on a private educational institution
was set to rest when the IRS successfully defended just such an action in
the Supreme Court case of Bob Jones University v. William E. Simon,
Secretary of Treasury (May 15, 1974).
The IRS is now simply extending its position down to the elementary
and secondary private educational level.
Of course, it is not an issue here of the Catholic Church opposing such
a policy because it believes in or practices racial discrimination. Quite the
contrary can be established by statistical evidence and policy statements
of Catholic authorities of long standing.
Rather, objections arise as to the inappropriateness and burden of the
IRS requirements, if implemented.
First of all, the proposed regulations would seem to be written as
requiring each school separately to perform the tasks of notice and report-
ing rather than recognizing the fact that Catholic schools are a part of a
system-Diocesan or Archdiocesan-wide. The burden of each of our 10,000
Catholic schools having to publish annually a notice of its nondiscrimi-
nation policies-as opposed to one publication by the Diocese, for exam-
ple-means the difference in cost of several millions of dollars annually.
But the policy requires more than mere notice and reporting-it re-
quires an affirmative action program to, in effect, desegregate. Indeed, the
regulations seem to be written more with regard to private academies than
our parish schools requiring, for example, that records be kept of all cata-
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logues, brochures, announcements, and other printed advertisements. Our
schools, being maintained primarily for our parishioners, simply don't en-
gage in such publications.
Must they now start? The artificiality and waste entailed in such an
effort would seem to answer the question but that is not what the regula-
tion says.
Other portions of the regulations require a reporting of the ownership,
donors of land, record keeping for three years of all applications for stu-
dents and employment for admission with annotated reasons for rejected
applications, copies of contributions received-apparently, giving the IRS
the right to audit Church funds since most of the funds for our parish
schools, as we know, come from our parishes themselves.
As you are aware, USCC's General Counsel has brought these incon-
sistencies and unreasonable burdens to the attention of the
IRS-particularly citing the inappropriateness of lumping together Catho-
lic schools (which make up the bulk of private education and have proven
their commitment to desegregation of the races) within a set of regulations
apparently written to bring controls to bear upon that small and distinct
area of private education-the private academy which is quite a different
animal from our schools as we know. We can hope these objections will be
appreciated and revisions achieved by the IRS in response. If not, a very
substantial burden will be added to our parish schools' task if they are to
remain exempt.
At the college level the impact of these regulations is seen as severely
burdensome. For example, it is not uncommon for a law school to receive
2500 applications annually for the 150-200 seats in its entering class; a
number of private law schools receive over 6000 applications. The storage
burden alone of three years of such applications, annotated and otherwise,
is of considerable concern to these schools.
Proposed HEW Rule Under Title IX of Educational Amendments of
972
On June 23, 1972 the Congress by Public Law 92-318 (20 U.S.C. §§
1681, 1683) adopted Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 to
eliminate discrimination on the basis of sex in any educational program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance.
Previously, Title IX of the Civil Rights Act forbade discrimination on
the basis of race, etc., but failed to include sex as within its proscriptions.
On June 20, 1974, the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare published proposed rules implementing
this statutory enactment. Broad as are the obvious implications of the Act
itself for religiously affiliated institutions, the rules would appear to go
even further into areas generally considered as being protected by our
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nation's constitutional principle of government neutrality. Certain ambi-
guities and serious conflicts appear inevitable and to some degree these
exacerbate and further confuse the issues at hand.
Let me cite one very significant instance: Section 901(a) of Title IX
states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance ....
In a paper discussing this entire subject as it impinges upon the colle-
giate level particularly, Professor Frolnmayer, (Journal of College and
University Law, 1974) notes that the guidelines written by HEW broaden
the coverage of this prohibition by including not just "education programs
receiving Federal financial assistance," but "to each education program or
activity which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance."
Under the statutory language it can be argued that nonpublic schools
under ESEA and ESAA are not the recipients of federal financial assis-
tance-that such assistance flows to children attending such schools. But
under the regulations can such a position be maintained?
Another example: Subsection 901(a)(3) of Title IX exempts from its
coverage "religiously controlled" educational institutions to the extent
that Title IX prohibitions would be inconsistent with the "religious tenets"
of the organization. The regulations (subsection 86.12(b)) implement this
section by placing the burden on the religious organization, in effect, to
prove that such a conflict and invasion of religious beliefs would occur and
then, most serious of all, leave to "the Director [the determination]
whether the institution qualified for the exemption." But how can such an
exercise of judgment, an examination and evaluation, if you will, of the
meaning and commitment of a given religious faith by a government offi-
cial be squared with the Supreme Court's oft-stated principle that the first
amendment mandates governmental neutrality and forbids governmental
surveillance of religion? Or is this principle only existent when it comes to
providing our children with their share of their parents' educational tax
dollar?
Just what is at stake here?
Well, there are the obvious matters with which we are all familiar and,
given time to achieve, generally support, e.g., elimination of sex based
discrimination in pay, pension benefits, and job opportunities. HEW is not
mandating the teaching of sex education but will require that, otherwise,
no classes can be segregated by sex. But, of far greater concern to us HEW
will prohibit the termination of disciplining students or teachers based
upon pregnancy, childbirth or abortion, discrimination on the basis of
grooming codes, or the hiring of one sex for given positions in preference
to another.
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I do not have to detail to you the impact such far-reaching require-
ments have in respect to our schools and colleges but let me cite just the
obvious if we are not held exempt:
1. We have many Catholic schools at various levels that are attended
only by one sex or the other.
2. Our schools are staffed by religious orders-nuns, priests, and broth-
ers-what about the requirement of equality of hiring regardless of sex here?
Is this not a violation of their religious mission?
3. What of the lay teacher who chooses notoriously to cohabit out of
wedlock, who has an abortion, who teaches our children birth control or
abortion as an acceptable moral concept. The regulations, if they apply to
us, would prohibit discipline or discharge.
4. Our seminaries prepare only males to become priests. The National
Organization for Women (NOW) in its official bulletin entitled Revolution:
Tomorrow is NOW demands that seminaries be opened up to women and
immediately stop their "sexist" doctrines which assign different roles to men
and women. It further advocates the equal employment of women theologians
in seminaries and that tax exemption be withdrawn on failure to comply.
5. While we may be able to sustain the burden of proof that our elemen-
tary and secondary schools are "religiously controlled," what can be said
about the status of some of the Catholic colleges which in the aftermath of
several of the U.S. Supreme Court aid cases restructured themselves and
passed control from the orders to lay boards of trustees broadly chosen from
the community? What price-federal aid?
6. Finally, if these regulations are imposed on our schools and colleges,
what of the effect of such burdens on religious belief and practice. How about
Speiser v. Randall; Spevack v. Klein; Sherbert v. Verner? Can a free govern-
ment of a free people require the surrender of religious conviction as a cost
of uniformity and equality?
The grave political truth we have to face is that ours is not the favored
position in today's world. That from within and without we face serious
opposition as the product of recent debates and that, politically, religious
freedom is a poor second at this moment to sexual equality.
So there is a lot going on and as the foregoing would indicate not all
of it has been overwhelmingly favorable to our team. My association with
the newly formed Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights has oc-
curred because of my concern that some positive steps be taken to provide
an agency to defend the rights of individuals and religious institutions
where such protection is lacking or where the League might prove a better
vehicle to act than, let us say, a Bishop of a Diocese, from a public relations
standpoint.
And there are things we can do. The trouble is, principally, we aren't
doing them. We are sitting on our rights or, at best, assuming a most
defensive and apologetic posture concerning them.
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You know down in Texas, a Dallas physician set up an abortion clinic
across the street from a Catholic high school. Some of the students and
their parents and others began picketing this clinic and the good doctor
filed a lawsuit seeking an injunction and $1 million in damages. The doctor
not only ended up dropping the lawsuit but he moved the clinic. The high
school leadership had stated when the suit began "Jesuit Prep as a school
did not sponsor the pickets but we certainly approve it. I don't know what
the doctor hopes to accomplish from this [litigation]. The pickets were
just expressing what they feel and that is that abortion is immoral." They
never waivered from that position and students, their parents, and sup-
porters ultimately routed the doctor from the court and neighborhood.
Our Catholic physicians and nurses are under continuing pressure
because of the abortion decision and because of threatened loss of employ-
ment or staff position unless they participate in such operations as abor-
tion, sterilization, and the like in violation of their religious views.
Conscience Clauses
A number of states in enacting legislation to regulate the practice of
abortion since Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, have included provisions
to protect medical personnel conscientiously opposed to this practice.
These provisions differ extensively, but in general provide that such medi-
cal personnel shall not be required to participate in abortions on penalty
of discharge, nor be discriminated against with respect to hiring, promo-
tion, pay, and other incidents of employment because of such objection.
These conscience provisions have, thus far, not been specifically or
seriously jeopardized as far as I am aware. However, in a recent case, Wolfe
v. Schroering, 386 F. Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974) a three-judge federal
court held unconstitutional most provisions of that State's abortion regula-
tion statute. A conscience provision, designed to protect medical person-
nel, was included in section 11 of this statute. This section also provided
that no hospital could be required to make its facilities available for abor-
tions, there being no differentiation between public and nonpublic hospi-
tals. On the authority of Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir.
1974), this section relative to hospitals was held unconstitutional. The
court, in its opinion, made no reference to the conscience clause as affect-
ing individual medical personnel having conscientious objection to the
practice. The Wolfe decision then must not be construed as affecting con-
science clauses. On appeal, however, the League on behalf of a number of
Kentucky physicians is endeavoring to intervene to clarify this issue and
make certain it does not become by misconstruction an adverse precedent.
In a Minnesota case, Hodgson v. Anderson, 378 F. Supp. 1008 (D.
Minn.), appeal dismissed, 420 U.S. 903 (1974), an attack being made on
the conscience clause as not being available to corporations, i.e., that
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"Hospital corporations . . . are unlikely candidates for the exercise of such
First Amendment rights of conscience as envisioned by the Free Exercise
of Religion." (Brief of Plaintiff, page 8). The ultimate purpose, of course,
is to require all hospitals, public, private, or denominational, to provide
facilities for abortions. All of this despite Justice Blackmun's clear
approval of a conscience clause in the Georgia abortion case.
But, generally, the conscience clause exempting both hospital and
individual (with the exception of the purely public hospital) has proven
immune from suit. Doe v. Bellin, 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973); Doe v. Hale
Hospital, 369 F. Supp. 970 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 907 (1975). Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364
F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973).
Catholic medical personnel in any state having a conscience clause
may accordingly invoke the same in appropriate administrative or judicial
proceedings if demand is made for their participation in an abortion.
Most conscience provisions have reference to moral as well as religious
scruple, and would therefore be available to personnel who have such
conscientious objection to abortion, regardless of denominational affilia-
tion.
These conscience clauses are generally keyed only to the practice of
abortion, and would probably not be applicable relative to sterilization,
contraception, and other medical practices objectionable to Catholics.
Civil Rights Act
Hospital personnel are also protected in respect to their civil rights by
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970),
as amended (Supp. III, 1973).
Section 2000e-2 provides it shall be "an unlawful employment practice
for an employer. . . to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions or privileges or employment because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex or national origin ... .
Enforcement provisions include restitution of employment, injunction
and in some cases damages. Section 2000e-5.
It is specified that: "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief. . . ." Section 2000e-(j). Section
2000e-2 has been held applicable to hospitals. Wilson v. Sibley Memorial
Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 686 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. Medical
Society, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969).
Section 2000e-2 has not been judicially tested relative to an em-
ployee's objection to participation in abortion, or similar objectional proce-
dures, but it is felt that such should be considered as an "aspect" of the
employee's "religious observance and practice."
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This section has been applied, relative to religious belief and practice,
most frequently in cases involving the refusal of employees to work on a
day held sacred in their denomination. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co.,
300 F. Supp. 709 (W.D. Mich. 1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970) and
by an equally divided Supreme Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). See also Shaf-
field v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services, 373 F. Supp. 937 (W.D. Ala.
1974); Reid v. Memphis Publishing Company, 369 F. Supp. 684 (W.D.
Tenn. 1973).
A weakness of section 2000e-2 is that the employer might be excused
from accommodating the employee's religious objection in event of "undue
hardship," Reid v. Memphis Publishing Company, supra. This is a very
general term, of course, and its construction would be difficult to forecast,
particularly in smaller hospitals, having limited staffs.
It might be noted also that section 2000e-1 exempts from Title VII "a
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities."
Although this was apparently intended to allow religious institutions
to discriminate in favor of their own denomination, it might be construed
as withdrawing the protection of Title VII from medical personnel em-
ployed in hospitals conducted by religious organizations (other than Cath-
olic) which have no rule against abortion, and other practices prohibited
in Catholic practice.
Section 2000e-5 outlines the procedure for enforcement of the Civil
Rights Act, implemented by section 1601.19 et seq., Regulations, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19 et seq.
(1975).
Action Before State Agency-EEOC Prerequisite
Most states, of course, have their own civil rights commission or simi-
lar agencies which are established to protect against religious and other
discrimination. In the state in which the alleged unlawful employment
practice alleged the aggrieved person must first commence proceedings
under the state law before proceeding before the EEOC.
A charge may be filed with the EEOC either within 180 days of the
alleged unlawful practice, or at expiration of 120 days time for action by
the state agency. Subsection 2000e-5(f)(1).
The EEOC is required to investigate the charge. If it finds there is
reasonable ground that the charge is true it "shall endeavor to eliminate
any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of
conference, conciliation and persuasion." Supra. Filing such a conciliation
agreement the Commission may file a civil action or, if it does not, then
the aggrieved party may do so. EEOC does not have cease and desist
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authority itself and is, unfortunately, very greatly understaffed with a huge
and growing backlog of cases. Consequently, while EEOC potentially is a
vehicle for assistance as a practical matter, it will probably prove inade-
quate unless it is presented with a whole pattern of religious discrimination
cases. In any event;.if the charge is sustained under the civil suit, the court
may enjoin the prohibited conduct, order reinstatement of the employee
in employment, and grant back pay. Attorneys' fees may be included in
court costs. Subsection 2000e-5(g).
While not mentioned in the U.S.C. text, cases cited indicate that
damages may be awarded in addition.
The advantage, of course, of acting through the EEOC or a state civil
rights commission is that the remedy is available without charge to the
aggrieved party. As I have indicated the EEOC processes present serious
practical problems of delay and even, ultimately, enforcement. State civil
rights agencies vary in their effectiveness, their case load and their orienta-
tion on these issues, so their availability and usefulness will have to be
tested first hand.
There remains, of course, self-help in the form of litigation of the issue
by the aggrieved party under state or federal court procedures. Section
1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, of course, presents a basis for challeng-
ing unlawful employment discrimination. A cause of action can be made
out at common law even in the absence of a state statute under which the
matter could be pursued within state courts. Such litigation necessarily
entails substantial costs and attorneys' fees which most individuals are
reluctant to or simply cannot bear. For the most part all of the pressure of
recent litigation which has proven so detrimental to our interests, rights
and beliefs has been brought by well funded groups having a philosophy
antagonistic to that of the Church-the ACLU, ZPG groups, NOW,
etc.-and, consequently, we find the law being etched under extremely
adverse factual situations and often times not defended aggressively, effec-
tively or, at times, at all. (Recall ZPG attorney's statement). The Catholic
League for Religious and Civil Rights is hardly in a position at this point
to take on all of these opponents or assume all these responsibilities, but
it is one vehicle which can be employed and, given adequate support, we
hope at least to fill part of the gap which is now so greatly jeopardizing
Church interests. It is our conviction, where action is called for, that a
positive and aggressive program of litigation, carefully selected to achieve
maximum and hopefully the most favorable results should be the manner
of proceeding. We believe, further, that the League can be a most useful
and effective tool available to the Church's needs while avoiding the in-
volvement of the Church itself institutionally in resolving some of these
critical issues regarding the protection of the civil rights of our people and
our religious faith.
We are in an environment which no longer affords the religious neu-
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trality which was ours in the past. Our views, our rights and our beliefs
are being litigated, legislated and much of the time at taxpayer-your and
my-expense. All I am saying is that, historically, every other minority in
the past history of this country has risen to its own defense, organized and
fought with skill within our democratic machinery.
We have yet to do so adequately or with determination. But others
have been able to do so; surely we should try.

